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Lifetime Banishment for Selling a Few Joints: The Case for the Modified Categorical 
Approach and Prosecutorial Discretion for Marijuana Sale Convictions in the Immigration 
Context 
By Jacqueline Stabnow* 
I. Introduction 
  Juan
1
 is a 25 year old legal permanent resident (“LPR”) from the Dominican Republic 
who entered the United States legally when he was seven years old. He graduated high school 
and attended college in the United States. Since graduating college, he has held a steady, 
managerial-level position and supported his mother with the income. In addition, Juan has eight 
U.S. citizen siblings and has only returned to the Dominican Republic twice since he immigrated 
18 years ago.  
 Last year, upon his return from a work-related trip abroad, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) officials detained Juan at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New 
York. The ICE officials stopped Juan because they discovered Juan’s old conviction of New 
York Penal Law § 221.40 (“NYPL § 221.40”), which is a misdemeanor marijuana sale statute. 
Juan had already completed the criminal sentence for this crime. However, pursuant to current 
immigration law, ICE has charged Juan with an “aggravated felony” under USC §101(a)(43(B) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). ICE has been holding Juan in a detention 
facility for over a year while he awaits his final deportation hearing before an immigration judge. 
If the immigration judge decides that he has committed what the immigration laws call an 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, 2012.  
1
 Not his real name. 
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“aggravated felony,” the United States will deport Juan and he will never be able to re-enter the 
United States again.
2
 
Juan would never be able to re-enter to the United States because Congress has decided that 
some crimes, namely aggravated felonies, are so heinous that most non-citizens
3
 who commit 
them should be deported and never allowed to return to the United States.
4
 The plain language of 
the term “aggravated felony” indicates that these crimes should be limited to dangerous felonies. 
However, ICE routinely charges immigrants who violate state misdemeanor marijuana sale 
statutes, such as NYPL § 221.40, with aggravated felonies. The Second Circuit has used what is 
called the “categorical approach” to analyzing criminal convictions and determined that a 
violation of NYPL § 221.40 is not an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. Conversely, 
the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have supported ICE’s policy and used a “modified 
categorical approach” to hold that a violation of the statute is usually an aggravated felony.  
This Note argues that, in order to comply with congressional intent, courts must analyze 
convictions under NYPL § 221.40 using the modified categorical approach. Under that approach, 
NYPL § 221.40 convictions are usually aggravated felonies, and people like Juan who sold 
marijuana for money are subject to deportation. However, ICE has the ability to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion, and may decide not to commence deportation proceedings against a 
non-citizen. ICE should exercise its prosecutorial discretion with regard to convictions such as 
                                                          
2
 Email from Sarah Deri-Oshiro, Immigration Attorney, The Bronx Defenders, to author (Sept. 12, 2011, 10:47 
EST) (on file with author). 
3
 My use of the term “non-citizens” refers to people in the United States who are not U.S. citizens and includes 
people in categories such as legal permanent residents, asylees, refugees, immigrant visa holders, non-immigrant 
visa holders, and undocumented immigrants.  The Immigration and Nationality Act refers to all of these people as 
“aliens,” but I have chosen not to use that term because of its inflammatory nature.  See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1 (4
th
 Ed. 2005) (noting that “alien” suggests “dehumanizing” 
qualities that emphasize segregation and stereotypes). 
4
 Some immigrants who commit aggravated felonies are eligible for a 212(c) waiver of inadmissibility under 18 
U.S.C. § 1182(h).  Legal permanent residents who have been convicted of aggravated felonies are ineligible for this 
waiver.  Non-citizens who are not legal permanent residents may be eligible for the waiver depending on the type of 
crime that they committed.  See, e.g., Malagon de Fuentes v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 498, 507-08 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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NYPL § 221.40 because, as reflected in their status as misdemeanors, they are relatively minor 
offenses and should be subject to lesser punishments. Immigrants with small marijuana sale 
convictions would still serve their criminal sentences and be deportable, but they would not face 
the harsh consequences of an aggravated felony conviction if ICE chose not to initiate 
proceedings.   
It is important to discuss the fact that selling small amounts of marijuana is an aggravated 
felony for immigration purposes and to properly analyze statutes such as NYPL § 221.40 
because of the immense consequences that these relatively minor criminal convictions can have 
on a non-citizen. Many non-citizens may not even be aware that these convictions may result in 
the worst possible immigration consequence, permanent banishment from the United States. This 
is also a timely issue in light of the fact that lawyers are currently litigating the categorization of 
NYPL § 221.40 and the current national discussion on the potential benefits and harms of 
marijuana.      
Part II will provide an overview of the current federal immigration law making aggravated 
felonies deportable offenses and the practical consequences of viewing small marijuana sale 
convictions as aggravated felonies. Part III presents the relevant federal drug law and its 
interaction with the aggravated felony statute. Part IV examines the text of NYPL § 221.40 and 
the relevance of state criminal law to the aggravated felony determination. Part V defines the 
modified categorical approach and the categorical approach to analyzing criminal convictions 
and presents the relevant court decisions on these approaches. Part VI argues that courts should 
use the modified categorical approach to analyze NYPL § 221.40 convictions. Finally, Part VII 
argues that ICE should use its prosecutorial discretion to decide not to begin deportation 
proceedings against people with convictions like NYPL § 221.40 because of the relatively minor 
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nature of the crime, lack of federal resources, and the government’s disparate treatment of 
medical marijuana dispensaries.  
 
 
II. Federal Immigration Law 
A.   Introduction 
 The statute that defines the term “aggravated felony” is part of the INA and is codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1101.
5
 Any non-citizen “who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after 
admission to the United States is deportable.”6 This section of the INA lists over 30 crimes that 
are aggravated felonies ranging from failure to appear in court to murder.
7
 Congress first created 
the “aggravated felony” category in the immigration context with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988.
8
 At that time, the only aggravated felony crimes were murder, drug trafficking crimes, and 
certain illicit trafficking offenses.
9
 In 1994, Congress broadened this definition through the 
Immigration and Nationality Technical Correction Act of 1994 to include crimes of violence, 
fraud and theft offenses, money laundering, child pornography, and document fraud.
10
  
 Prior to 1996, the simple conviction of one of the enumerated crimes was insufficient to 
sustain an aggravated felony conviction.
11
 In addition to the conviction, the judge had to actually 
sentence the immigrant to a term of five years or more in order for the crime to be considered an 
                                                          
5
 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §1101 (a)(43)(B) (2011).  
6
 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008). 
7
 Id.  
8
 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 
394 (2007).   
9
 Id.; Prior to 1996, a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony was deportable and, if deported, could seek re-
admission to the United States after twenty years. Non-citizens who were sentenced to less than five years in prison 
could apply for a waiver of deportation under Section 212(c) of 8 U.S.C. 1182(c).  Melissa Cook, Banished for 
Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights 
Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293, 299, 301, 305 (2003).     
10
 Wadhia, supra note 8, at 394. 
11
 Dawn Marie Johnson, Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477 (2001). 
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aggravated felony.
12
 In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”)13 and Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”)14 which changed the sentencing requirements and definition of a conviction.15  It 
also made the aggravated felony statute retroactive, such that the statute’s penalties apply to 
immigrants who committed crimes before the statute was enacted.
 16
  
B. Current Law 
 The most recent version of the law requires an immigrant to be convicted of an 
enumerated crime and sentenced only to “some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 
alien’s liberty.”17 A conviction, for aggravated felony purposes, is a “formal judgment of guilt 
entered by a court, guilty plea, or the admission of sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt” 18 
The definition of conviction also includes suspended sentences and dispositions that are not 
treated as convictions by the state such as expunged convictions.
19
  
 During the debate on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, one senator described the 1988 
aggravated felony statute as very limited, “focusing on a particularly dangerous class of 
‘aggravated alien felons,’ that is, aliens convicted of murder and drug . . . trafficking.”20 
However, it now applies to over 30 crimes, and immigrants can be considered to have been 
convicted of aggravated felonies that, under the relevant criminal law, are neither aggravated nor 
                                                          
12
 Johnson, supra note 11, at 477. 
13
 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Division C—Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. 
L.  No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
14
 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1014. 
15
 Wadhia, supra note 8, at 394,395. 
16
 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §1101 (a)(43)(U) (2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law (including any effective date), the term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or 
after September 30, 1996).  
17
 8 U.S.C.A. §1101 (a)(43)(B) (2011). 
18
 Id. 
19
 8 U.S.C.A. §1101 (a)(43)(A) (2011); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws 
and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936,1942 (2000); Wadhia, supra note 8 at 397. 
20
 Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 134 CONG. REC. S17301, S17318 
(1988) (statement of Sen. D’Amato)). 
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felonious.
21
 In the criminal context, a felony is a “serious crime usually punishable by 
imprisonment for more than 1 year or by death.”22 Jurisdictions only consider very serious 
felonies to be “aggravated,” and they usually involve violence, use of a deadly weapon, or intent 
to commit another crime.
23
 In the immigration context, however, federal courts and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals have ruled that under the 1996 amendments to the INA even some state 
misdemeanor convictions are aggravated felonies.
24
 As the Second Circuit has stated, Congress 
can make the word “misdemeanor mean felony because we consider Congress to be the master- 
that’s all.”25   
C. Immigration Consequences 
 Thus, any controlled substance violation that is punishable as a federal felony is an 
aggravated felony for immigration purposes.
26
 In Juan’s case, ICE charged him with an 
aggravated felony under the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) because of his state misdemeanor 
marijuana sale conviction. This subsection of the aggravated felony definition states that “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug 
trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)” is an aggravated felony.27  
 One immigration scholar has commented that “[a]ggravated felons populate the eighth 
ring of immigration hell.”28 This is because an aggravated felony conviction results in the worst 
possible immigration consequences.  As previously stated, any non-citizen who is charged with 
an aggravated felony at any time after admission to the United States is deportable.
29
 The U.S. 
                                                          
21
 Morawetz, supra note 19, at 1939. 
22
 Carachurri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2585 (2010).   
23
 Id.  
24
 See, e.g., U.S. v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 153 (2000); Matter of Aruna, 24 I. & N. Dec. 452, 454 (2008).  
25
 Pacheco, 130 S. Ct. at 149. 
26
 Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 59-60 (2006); U.S. v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2002). 
27
 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §1101 (a)(43)(B) (2011).  
28
 Cook, supra note 9, at 298.  
29
 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008). 
7 
 
Supreme Court recognized the severity of deportation as far back as 1947 when it remarked that 
“[d]eportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”30 While 
deportation is not technically a criminal sentence, the effects of deportation on an immigrant may 
be worse than a criminal sentence.
31
 Deportation may cause a person to “lose his family, his 
friends and his livelihood forever. Return to his native land may result in poverty, persecution or 
even death.”32  
 In some limited circumstances, deportable immigrants are able to remain in the United 
States because defenses to deportation are available to them.
33
 However, this is almost never true 
for non-citizens who are convicted of aggravated felonies; these immigrants are barred from 
virtually all relief from deportation.
34
 The 1996 revisions to the aggravated felony statute 
eliminated what is called the 212(c) waiver for LPRs with aggravated felony convictions.
35
 
Before these revisions, the 212(c) was the most common form of relief from deportation for 
LPRs with criminal convictions and allowed some LPRs with aggravated felony convictions to 
receive discretionary relief from an immigration judge.
36
 Now, because of the Supreme Court 
decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, non-citizens with aggravated 
felony convictions are able to obtain a 212(c) waiver in only very limited circumstances.
37
   
                                                          
30
 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citing Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947)). 
31
 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).  
32
 Cook, supra note 9, at 293. 
33
 BRYAN LONEGAN, IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND REMOVAL: A GUIDE FOR DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 13-
17 (2004), available at http://shusterman.com/pdf/detention1004.pdf.   
34
 Aggravated felons cannot receive asylum, but the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) may grant them the 
lesser remedies of withholding of removal or deferral under the Convention Against Torture. 8 U.S.C.A. § 
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2009); 8 CFR § 212.17(b)(2) (2011).  A non-citizen with an aggravated felony may be able to 
receive a “U” or “T” visa if the Attorney General grants the person a waiver. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(14) (2010). 
35
 INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2277 (2001); see also Lonegan, supra note 33, at 13.  
36
 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. at 2276-77; see also Lonegan, supra note 33, at 13. 
37
 St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct at 2293; see also Lonegan, supra note 33, at 13-14. 
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 Also, all non-citizens charged with aggravated felonies are subject to mandatory 
detention.
38
 Thus, because Juan decided to fight his aggravated felony conviction, ICE has held 
him in a detention center since April 2010.
39
 Time in a detention facility is technically not a 
criminal punishment, and non-citizens typically stay in detention the entire time while they fight 
their cases or wait for a flight to their country of origin.
40
 Non-citizens in mandatory detention 
cannot request bond from an immigration judge and may stay in detention for years while they 
fight their cases.
41
 As a result of this system, non-citizens who have never been in jail or have 
served their sentences are effectively incarcerated.
42
 Due to varying bed availability in ICE’s 
network of immigration detention centers, ICE may move immigrants in detention thousands of 
miles away from their homes, families, and available legal counsel for the duration of the 
litigation.
43
   
 Finally, many non-citizens who are convicted of aggravated felonies and deported can 
never return to the United States.
44
 This is the perhaps the most drastic consequence of an 
aggravated felony conviction. LPRs who are deported because of an aggravated felony 
conviction are not eligible for a 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
45
 
This waiver allows non-citizens who have been convicted of some crimes to re-enter the United 
States.
46
 Non-citizens with aggravated felony convictions who are not legal permanent residents 
                                                          
38
 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
39 Email from Sarah Deri-Oshiro, Immigration Attorney, The Bronx Defenders, to author (Sept. 12, 2011, 10:47 
EST) (on file with author). 
40
 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); see also Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 730 
(1893). 
41
 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2(A)(iii) (2008); Morawetz, supra note 19, at 1939, 1947.  
42
 Morawetz, supra note 19, at 1940; Wadhia, supra note 8, at 396. 
43
 Morawetz, supra note 19, at 1944. 
44
 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2006).   
45
 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(h) (2010). 
46
 Id.  
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may be eligible for a 212(c) waiver.
47
 However, these non-citizens are ineligible for a 212(c) 
waiver if they have been convicted of any drug crime except for simple possession of 30 grams 
or less of marijuana.
48
 This can create a terrible situation in which all the members of a person’s 
family are U.S. citizens or LPRs and the aggravated felon is banished to another country where 
he has few or no family ties, no job, no place to live, and may not even speak the language.   
 
D. Consequences of Viewing Small Marijuana Sales as Aggravated Felonies 
 It is very difficult to find statistics on the exact number of people who are deported from 
the United States each year for marijuana sale convictions because ICE does not break down the 
data on criminal deportations into specific types of drug offense crimes in the statistics it makes 
readily available to the public.
49
  However, a ten year study from Human Rights Watch of all 
non-citizens deported for criminal conduct between April 1, 1997 and August 1, 2007 found that 
897,099 people were deported after serving their sentences for criminal conduct.
50
 Marijuana 
sale convictions were one of the top fifteen reasons that people with criminal convictions were 
deported from the United States and accounted for 8,317 deportations, or roughly 0.9 percent of 
all criminal deportations.
51
 There is no reason to believe that these numbers will decline. For 
fiscal year 2011, ICE deported 396,906 people, which is about forty-two percent of the total 
number of people deported between 1997 and 2007.
52
 Assuming that approximately the same 
                                                          
47
 See, e.g., Gonzales, 462 F.3d at 507-08. 
48
 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(h) (2010). 
49
 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS: 2010 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-
2010.pdf. 
50
 Forced Apart (By the Numbers), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node 
/10856/section/7 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011, 4:25 PM). 
51
 Id. 
52
Alan Silverleib, Obama’s Deportation Record: Inside the Numbers, CNN (Oct. 19, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com 
/2011-10-19/politics/politics_deportation-record_1_ice-director-john-morton-undocumented-immigrants-criminal-
alien-program?_s=PM:POLITICS (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).  
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number of people were deported for marijuana sales as between 1997 and 2007, then ICE 
deported about 3,572 people for marijuana sales in fiscal year 2011 alone.
53
      
 As previously discussed, the consequences of an aggravated felony convictions are steep 
and include deportability,
54
 lack of most defenses to deportation,
55
 mandatory detention,
56
 and, 
for many, a permanent bar to re-entering the United States.
57
 These consequences are felt most 
heavily by LPRs, or “green card holders.”58 LPRs have permission to reside in the United States 
and must reside continuously in the United States except for “innocent, casual, and brief” trips 
abroad.
59
 In order to become a LPR, a person must possess employment skills needed in the 
United States or have a close family member who already has status in the U.S.
60
 LPRs have 
many of the same rights and responsibilities as U.S. Citizens such as U.S. military service, equal 
protection and due process rights.
61
 Despite the fact that some LPRs, like Juan, have spent more 
of their lives in the U.S. than abroad, they can be deported for aggravated felony convictions.
62
 
The separation of families as a result of this statute contradicts one of the main objectives of 
immigration law to keep families together.
63
 The banishment of close family from the United 
States for life can have devastating effects on other family members. For example, seventeen 
year old Gerardo Mosquera Jr. committed suicide in 1998 after his father, an LPR for twenty-
                                                          
53
 Author’s calculations based on the data in Forced Apart (By the Numbers), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 15, 
2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/10856/section/7 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011, 4:25 PM). 
54 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008). 
55 Lonegan, supra note 33 at 13-17; see supra note 34.  
56 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
57
 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(2010). 
58
 Johnson, supra note 11, at 479. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2010); Natalie Liem, Mean What You Say, Say 
What You Mean: Defining the Aggravated Felony Deportation Grounds to Target More than Aggravated Felons, 59 
FLA. L. REV. 1071, 1091 (2007). 
63
 Morawetz, supra note 19, at 1950-51. 
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nine years, was deported to Colombia because of a $10 marijuana sale he made in 1989.
64
 
Gerardo was a U.S. citizen, and stories like his raise questions about the damage that the current 
interpretation of the drug trafficking portion of the aggravated felony statute have on U.S. citizen 
children when their parents are permanently deported for minor drug crimes.  
III. Federal Drug Law 
 To determine if a non-citizen like Juan has committed an aggravated felony for illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance, immigration judges must determine if the drug crime in 
question is a federal felony. Immigration judges look to the sections of the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”)65 referred to by the INA’s aggravated felony statute in order to make 
that determination. Under the CSA, marijuana is a schedule I controlled substance because, 
according to the federal statute, it has a high potential for abuse and no currently accepted 
medical use.
66
 The CSA defines “drug trafficking crime” by stating that it is illegal for a person 
to “knowingly or intentionally . . . manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or to create, distribute, or dispense, 
or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance.”67 In the case of 
marijuana, all sales for remuneration are federal felonies.
68
 There is also a misdemeanor 
exception for “distributing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration.”69 If a non-citizen 
sells marijuana for no remuneration, he has committed a federal misdemeanor and not a federal 
felony and therefore has not committed an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.
70
 
IV. The Relevance of State Criminal Law to Aggravated Felony Determinations 
                                                          
64
 Patrick J. McDonnell, Deportation Shatters Family, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at B1. 
65
 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 (2006). 
66
 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(c)(c)(10) (2006).  
67
 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (2010). 
68
 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2010). 
69
 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(4) (2010).   
70
 Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 59-60 (2006); U.S. v. Simpson, 319 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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 Due to the references to them in the INA, the federal drug statutes are relevant to the 
question of whether a crime is an aggravated felony, even when a non-citizen is convicted of a 
state - and not federal- drug offense. A state drug conviction is an “aggravated felony” if it is a 
felony under federal criminal law and contains a trafficking element or is punishable under the 
CSA.
71
 Therefore, a state misdemeanor that contains the element of trafficking can qualify as an 
aggravated felony if the conduct would be punishable as a felony under federal law.
72
 A state 
conviction for sale of marijuana is an aggravated felony if it is equivalent to a felony drug 
trafficking conviction under the CSA.
73
 This analysis leads to the counterintuitive conclusion 
that a state misdemeanor marijuana sale conviction may be a federal felony and therefore an 
aggravated felony for immigration purposes.   
 New York penal law section 221.40 (NYPL § 221.40), the statute under which Juan was 
convicted, provides an excellent example of this interaction between state and federal law and 
the application of the aggravated felony statute. NYPL § 221.40 punishes the criminal sale of 
marijuana in the fourth degree and is a misdemeanor offense.
74
 It states that a person is guilty of 
this crime when he “knowingly and unlawfully sells marihuana except as provided in section 
221.35.”75 This statute punishes marijuana sales between two and 25 grams.76 An important 
aspect of this statute for immigration purposes is the definition of the word “sell.” The statute 
                                                          
71
 Lopez, 549 U.S. at 59-60; Simpson, 319 F. 2d at 85.  
72 Lopez, 549 U.S. at 59-60; Simpson, 319 F. 2d at 85.  
73
 Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 2008). 
74
 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.40 (McKinney 1977). 
75
 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.40; NYPL § 221.35 is sale of marijuana in the fifth degree. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.35 
(McKinney 1979). This statute does not expressly state the amount of marijuana necessary to be convicted under 
NYPL § 221.40. However, it is situated between the statute defining fifth degree criminal marijuana sale, which 
punishes distribution of two grams or fewer of marijuana or a single marijuana cigarette for no consideration, and 
the statute defining third degree criminal marijuana sale which punishes distribution of 25 grams or more. Therefore, 
NYPL § 221.40 must cover distribution of fewer than 25 grams for consideration or between two and 25 grams for 
no consideration.  
76
 For reference, a paperclip weighs approximately 1 gram. Two grams is 0.004 (1/250) of a pound, and twenty-five 
grams are 0.055 (11/200) of a pound. Allan Turner & Becky Lewis, Stopping Drugs in the Mail, CORRECTIONS 
TODAY, July 2002, at para. 4. 
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defines “sell” as “sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to do the 
same.”77 This means that a person can be convicted of a marijuana sale under NYPL § 221.40 
without ever literally selling marijuana in exchange for money or other consideration. If someone 
gives fewer than 25 grams of marijuana to a friend in New York, he may be convicted of a 
misdemeanor marijuana “sale.” 
 In some states, the sale of any amount of marijuana for remuneration is a felony.
78
 In 
1977, the New York legislature decided to exclude marijuana from its definition of a controlled 
substance and create criminal penalties for marijuana separate from other drugs such as heroin.
79
 
The legislature decided to makes these changes in order to reduce the penalties for marijuana 
crimes and to decriminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana.
80
 In doing so, New 
York made clear that the state did not want to encourage marijuana use. Indeed, the legislature’s 
goal was to “insure that the many people in New York who commit the conduct which this act 
makes a violation not be subjected to unduly harsh sanctions.”81 Additionally, the legislature 
remarked that the new penalties were more “reasonably appropriate to the nature of 
marihuana.”82 Therefore, for the INA to consider a misdemeanor marijuana sale conviction under 
NYPL §221.40 to be an aggravated felony and a deportable offense is an interpretation that 
directly collides with the intent of the legislative body that created NYPL §221.40.   
V. The Modified Categorical Approach and the Categorical Approach 
A. Overview 
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 Immigration courts use either what is called the “categorical approach” or what is known 
as the “modified categorical approach” in order to determine whether a crime is an aggravated 
felony.
83
 In deciding which approach to implement, the immigration judge must evaluate 
whether the state conviction is divisible. If a statute is divisible, the courts will use what is called 
the modified categorical approach instead of the categorical approach to analyze the 
conviction.
84
  
 There does not appear to be any definitive Supreme Court standard for what makes a 
statute divisible. According to the Second Circuit, a criminal statute is divisible if it encompasses 
multiple categories of offensive conduct, some, but not all, of which would categorically 
constitute aggravated felonies under the INA.
85
 Thus, in the context of marijuana sale statutes, 
those statutes which include acts that are not federal felonies, such as the sale of small amounts 
for no remuneration, as well as acts that are felonies, are arguably divisible.  
 If a statute is not divisible, the categorical approach requires that courts look at whether 
the minimum conduct in the state criminal statute is sufficient to qualify as a felony under federal 
law.
86
 If it is not, then the person cannot be considered an aggravated felon for INA purposes. 
For example, if a court analyzes a marijuana sale statute using the categorical approach, it looks 
to the statute that defines the offense and decides whether all convictions under that statute 
necessarily meet the requirements of the aggravated felony statute.
87
 The court does not examine 
the facts underlying the conviction in a person’s particular case to see if the person actually 
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committed acts comprising a felony under the CSA.
88
 Under this approach, an immigration judge 
will never find a non-citizen who has been convicted of NYPL § 221.40 to have committed an 
aggravated felony regardless of whether he sold marijuana for money or for no remuneration.  
This is because the state statute’s minimum conduct necessary for a conviction does not 
constitute an aggravated felony. 
  If a statute is divisible and the court then uses the modified categorical approach, it 
examines the record of conviction to see if the immigrant actually committed an act that 
constitutes an aggravated felony.
89
 If, for example, a divisible statute punishes both the sale of 
marijuana for remuneration and the sale of marijuana for no remuneration, the court will look to 
the record of conviction to determine if the person actually sold marijuana for remuneration.
90
 
The court will decide that the immigrant committed an aggravated felony if the record of 
conviction indicates that the person actually performed behavior that constitutes an aggravated 
felony.
91
 Under the modified categorical approach, a person convicted of NYPL § 221.40 will 
have committed an aggravated felony unless the person sold marijuana for no remuneration.   
B. Supreme Court Decisions 
 The Supreme Court has never specifically ruled on NYPL § 221.40 or any other state 
marijuana sale law as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. However, the complicated 
nature of the aggravated felony bar has recently led the Supreme Court to issue rulings on its 
application.  
 First, in Lopez v. Gonzales, the Court decided that an LPR’s state felony conviction for 
aiding and abetting another person’s possession of cocaine was a misdemeanor under federal law 
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and therefore not an aggravated felony.
92
 The Court examined the language of the INA’s 
aggravated felony provision and the phrase “punishable as a felony under the CSA.”93 Mere 
possession is not a felony under the CSA, so even though the LPR committed a state felony, his 
crime did not meet the requirements for an aggravated felony.
94
 This case reinforces the fact that 
misdemeanors under federal law are not aggravated felonies. Therefore, even if a court uses the 
modified categorical approach, those non-citizens with NYPL § 221.40 convictions who sold 
marijuana for no remuneration would not be aggravated felons.    
 In Nijhawan v. Holder, a case not involving drug crimes, the Court rejected the 
application of the categorical approach to a conviction involving “an offense that involves fraud 
or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”95  This is because the Court 
believes that Congress intended for an immigration court to decide if the person did in fact cause 
a loss exceeding $10,000.
96
 The categorical approach would not be sufficient in that case because 
of the circumstance-specific nature of the crime.
97
 The Court contrasted this statute with other 
provisions such as the illicit drug trafficking statute which “must refer to generic offenses” and 
therefore receives categorical treatment.
98
 While the Court mentions the illicit drug trafficking 
statute in dicta, it actually gives credence to the use of the modified categorical approach when 
analyzing NYPL § 221.40 convictions because the circumstances of the crime, whether or not 
the person sold marijuana for money, are crucial to the aggravated felony determination.  
C. Circuit Court Decisions 
                                                          
92
 Lopez, 549 U.S. at 50. 
93
 Id. at 60.  
94
 Id. at 53, 60. 
95
 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2298, 2302 (2009). 
96
 Id. at 2302.  
97
 Id. at 2587 
98
 Id.  
17 
 
 There is still a lot of dispute among the circuit courts over what state crimes constitute 
aggravated felonies and when to apply the categorical or modified categorical approaches. The 
Second Circuit, which has jurisdiction over New York State, stated in Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security
99
 that the Court had only found statutes to be divisible where 
the different forms of conduct are “listed in different subsections or comprise discrete elements 
of a disjunctive list of proscribed conduct.”100 However, in Dickson v. Ashcroft the Second 
Circuit also found a statute divisible if its definitional section, located outside of the specific text 
of the statute, describes two forms of conduct.
101
 The Court stated that a broader concept of 
divisible statutes could more fully effectuate the purpose of the immigration laws.
102
 Like the 
statute in Dickson v. Ashcroft, NYPL § 221.40’s definitional section is outside of the specific text 
of the statute and describes two forms of conduct. This decision indicates that NYPL § 221.40 is 
divisible even though the different forms of conduct are not listed in different subsections or 
comprise discrete elements of a disjunctive list in the text of the statute.
103
   
 The Second Circuit later applied the categorical approach in Martinez v. Mukasey to a 
conviction under NYPL §221.40 and ruled that it is not an aggravated felony because the statute 
encompasses convictions for no remuneration and as little as two grams of marijuana.
104
 The 
Court stated that it takes no position on whether NYPL § 221.40 is subject to the modified 
categorical approach because “neither party indicated anything in the record of conviction that 
would bring about a different result were the modified categorical approach to apply.”105  
Therefore, there is no precedential Second Circuit case on whether to use the modified 
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categorical approach or the categorical approach with regard to NYPL § 221.40 and this decision 
does not conflict with Dulal-Whiteway.      
 The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have all applied the modified categorical approach 
to NYPL § 221.40.
106
 In Thomas v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit determined that the 
definition of “sale” under definitional section NYPL § 200.00(1) is disjunctive and “gives rise to 
four alternative grounds for establishing culpability under the statute.”107 Of the four grounds, 
“selling and exchanging” constitute federal felonies under the CSA and are therefore aggravated  
felonies.
108
 Consequently, courts must apply the modified categorical approach to determine 
which type of conduct the person actually performed.
109
  
 The Fifth Circuit used a similar analysis in Allen v. Holder and Jordan v. Gonzales.
110
  
In both cases, the defendants had NYPL § 221.40 convictions and the court applied the modified 
categorical approach.
111
 However, the records in Jordan did not indicate that there was 
remuneration, so the court held that Jordan was not an aggravated felon.
112
 Conversely, in Allen, 
the record of conviction indicated that Allen sold marijuana for remuneration and Allen 
committed an aggravated felony.
113
 These two cases provide the perfect example of how the 
modified categorical approach operates to ensure that only those non-citizens who actually 
commit federal felonies will be charged with aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. In 
Dias v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit used the same analysis to decide that a NYPL § 221.40 
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conviction is not categorically an aggravated felony but remanded to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals without discussing the underlying record or facts of the case.
114
   
D.  Selected Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions  
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)115 has issued several unpublished decisions 
with conflicting opinions regarding NYPL § 221.40 and the application of the modified 
categorical approach and the categorical approach. For example, in In re Mascoll
116
 the BIA 
applied the categorical approach to NYPL § 221.40 and decided that it is an aggravated felony, 
but it applied the modified categorical approach to NYPL § 221.40 in In re Scarlett.
117 
 In In re 
Mascoll, the BIA applied the categorical approach and concluded that NYPL § 221.40 is an 
aggravated felony.
118
 The BIA based this conclusion on its misconception that the misdemeanor 
to the CSA is only a sentencing mitigating exception and because Mascoll’s police report 
indicates that he sold remuneration, he is not eligible for this mitigating factor.
119
 This analysis 
conflates the modified categorical approach and the categorical approach and mischaracterizes 
the misdemeanor felony provision under the CSA as a mitigating factor instead of a separate type 
of crime.
120
   
Less than a year later, in In re Scarlett, the BIA decided that the modified categorical 
approach must be applied to NYPL § 221.40 convictions because the statute includes offenses 
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that do and do not constitute aggravated felonies.
121
 While this decision conflicts with In re 
Mascoll, the BIA based its decision in In re Mascoll on a misinterpretation of federal drug law.  
Therefore, In re Scarlett provides a better analysis of the actual law and probable outcome of a 
future precedential BIA decision on NYPL § 221.40.    
VI. NYPL § 221.40 Should Be Analyzed Under the Modified Categorical Approach 
 In light of congressional intent, federal and state law, and prior court decisions, courts 
should use the modified categorical approach to analyze convictions under NYPL § 221.40. The 
application of the modified categorical approach means that more immigrants may become 
deportable as aggravated felons, but under the current judicial and statutory framework, it is not 
feasible to analyze these convictions under the categorical approach. 
 First and foremost, NYPL § 221.40 is a divisible statute.
122
 The text of the statute itself 
only includes the verb “sell,” but a quick glance at the definitional section, NYPL § 220.00, 
reveals that “sell” means to “sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to 
do the same.”123 Advocates of the categorical approach argue that, under Dulal-Whiteway, the 
statute is not divisible because it is not divided by commas or into subsections.
124
 However, 
under Second Circuit precedent in Dickson v. Ashcroft, a statute may be divisible if its 
definitional section includes both conduct that is and is not an aggravated felony.
125
 A state drug 
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony when it is either a felony under state law and 
contains a trafficking element or is punishable as a felony under the CSA.
126
 NYPL § 221.40 is a 
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misdemeanor, so the question is whether it is punishable as a felony under the CSA.
127
 All sale 
offenses under the CSA are felonies except for sale of “small amount of marijuana for no 
remuneration.”128 The sale of a “small amount of marijuana for no remuneration is a 
misdemeanor” under the CSA.129  Therefore, statute NYPL § 221.40 includes both conduct that 
is an aggravated felony and is not an aggravated felony and is a divisible statute. Once a statute 
is divisible, a court applies the modified categorical approach and look at the record of 
conviction to discover which type of conduct the individual actually committed.
130
   
 The modified categorical approach allows the U.S. government to charge those 
immigrants who committed acts that are punishable as felonies under the CSA with aggravated 
felonies. This approach may lead to heartbreaking results in which an LPR like Juan becomes 
separated from his entire family and is unable to re-enter the country where he established his 
life because of the sale of a very small amount of marijuana.  However, Congressional intent 
indicates that this is the type of result that Congress desires for individuals who engage in illicit 
trafficking, no matter how small. Illicit drug trafficking was one of the first aggravated felonies 
Congress established in alongside murder.
131
 Statements that Congress intended to punish “a 
particularly dangerous type of aggravated felon” such as “drug traffickers” lends credence to this 
argument.
132
 The fact that Congress has increased the qualifying aggravated felony crimes and 
made the penalties harsher indicates that Congress is fully aware that an aggravated felony 
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conviction imposes tough consequences and applies to crimes that are much more minor than 
murder.
133
  
 Advocates of the categorical approach cite Carachurri-Rosendo v. Holder and Nijhawan 
as stating that courts must apply the categorical approach to drug-trafficking convictions.
134
  
However, neither case makes such a statement nor specifically analyzes a divisible statute like 
NYPL § 221.40. The Supreme Court case of Carachurri-Rosendo only indicates that it “might be 
appropriate” to apply the categorical approach to drug trafficking crimes and does not make the 
application mandatory.
135
 In Nijhawan, the court contrasted drug-trafficking crimes with crimes 
such as fraud involving $10,000 or more which is a fact specific inquiry.
136
 However, the 
Nijhawan Court was not analyzing a drug conviction and this dicta should not be taken as a 
reflection of the Supreme Court’s willingness to apply the categorical approach to the divisible 
drug statute.
137
 
 Martinez v. Mukasey also does not support the application of the categorical approach in 
the face of a divisible statute. At first glance, the Martinez analysis appears to state that NYPL § 
221.40 convictions are categorically not aggravated felonies. It is true that the Court applied the 
categorical approach and held that despite his conviction for NYPL § 221.40, Martinez did not 
commit an aggravated felony because the minimum conduct necessary to be convicted for that 
offense, “sale” of two grams of marijuana for no remuneration, would not be punishable as a 
felony under the CSA.
138
  However, the Court discussed in a footnote the use of the modified 
categorical approach for divisible statutes when a statute “encompasses diverse classes of 
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criminal acts-some of which would be grounds for removal and others of which would not.”139 
Importantly, the Court states that it takes no position on whether NYPL § 221.40 is subject to the 
modified categorical approach because “neither party indicated anything in the record of 
conviction that would bring about a different result were the modified categorical approach to 
apply.”140  This statement indicates that either the government did not raise the issue of 
divisibility or the record indicated that Martinez did not sell marijuana for remuneration.  Either 
way, the Second Circuit specifically reserved the question of NYPL § 221.40’s divisibility and 
did not create a binding precedent that courts should always use the categorical approach to 
analyze these convictions.
141
 
 Although the BIA has not published a binding opinion on the divisibility of NYPL, its 
decisions in In re Mascoll and In re Scarlett indicate that it finds NYPL § 221.40 to be a 
divisible statute and would apply the modified categorical approach. The BIA should review the 
CSA and be sure to familiarize itself with the misdemeanor crime of selling a small amount of 
marijuana for no remuneration so that it won’t charge immigrants who did not actually perform 
sufficient conduct to constitute an aggravated felony with an aggravated felony.   
VII. ICE Should Use Its Prosecutorial Discretion to Not Begin Deportation Proceedings 
Against Non-citizens with Small Marijuana Sale Convictions Because of its Limited 
Enforcement Resources and Disparate Treatment of Medical Marijuana Dispensaries 
 Many of the advocates for the categorical approach to analyzing marijuana sale 
convictions such as NYPL § 221.40 are not advocating for the approach solely because they 
believe that precedent supports its use. They support the categorical approach because it has the 
potential to prevent people like Juan from facing the disastrous consequences of an aggravated 
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felony conviction if the statute of conviction includes conduct that is not a federal felony under 
the CSA. While their argument may not make sense legally, there is an argument to be made that 
ICE officers should use their prosecutorial discretion and not begin deportation proceedings 
against non-citizens. ICE should use its prosecutorial discretion in the small marijuana sale 
context because of its limited enforcement resources and the widespread disregard for federal 
marijuana law in 15 states and Washington, D.C. 
A. ICE Should Use its Prosecutorial Discretion in Favor of Non-Citizens with Small 
Marijuana Sale Convictions in Light of its Limited Enforcement Resources and the 
Overburdened Immigration Court System 
 
 An ICE officer has the ability to exercise prosecutorial discretion to decide which non-
citizens it wants to begin deportations proceedings against.
142
 ICE must set priorities because it 
would be impossible for it to conduct deportation proceedings against the estimated 11 million 
undocumented people residing in the United States.
143
 This figure also does not begin to take into 
account the other non-citizens who entered the country legally, such as Juan, and are now 
deportable for various reasons. ICE reservedly states that the agency is “confronted with more 
administrative violations that its resources can address.”144  
 Additionally, the administrative courts who adjudicate all of the immigration cases have 
extremely overcrowded dockets.
145
 This is due in part to the fact that there are simply not enough 
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immigration judges to hear the cases promptly.
146
 Twelve percent of the immigration judge 
positions remain unfilled.
147
 In 2006, 215 judges were responsible for over 300,000 cases, which 
means that each judge heard approximately 1400 cases that year.
148
 The number of cases in 2006 
was an eighty-two percent increase from 1996.
149
 As a result of the lack of judges and increased 
number of cases, there are currently about 297,551 immigration cases backlogged in immigration 
court waiting to be heard.
150
 The average wait time for an immigrant’s case to be heard before a 
judge is a whopping 489 days.
151
 For people like Juan who fight an aggravated felony charge, 
that can mean spending over a year in a detention facility before an immigration judge decides 
whether his criminal conviction is actually an aggravated felony.
152
 While the overburdened 
immigration court system is a symptom of a much larger problem with the immigration system 
in our country, it gives ICE even more reason to be selective in who it decides to charge. 
 On June 17, 2011, ICE issued a memorandum setting forth its enforcement priorities and 
providing guidance to its officers on how to exercise prosecutorial discretion.
153
 The 
memorandum lists its priorities as ensuring national security, border security, public safety, and 
the integrity of the immigration system.
154
 In addition to these broad principles, the 
memorandum lists negative factors that should get “prompt particular care and consideration” by 
ICE.
155
 These include: individuals who pose a clear risk to national security, serious felons, 
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repeat offenders, individuals with lengthy criminal records of any kind, known gang members or 
other individuals who pose a clear danger to public safety, individuals with an egregious record 
of immigration violations, and individuals with a record of illegal re-entry and those who have 
engaged in immigration fraud.
156
 Of course, ICE reserves the right to begin deportation 
proceedings against anyone it believes is deportable.
157
 The memorandum also lists factors that 
should be given positive discretion such as being a long-time LPR, people who have lived in the 
United States since childhood, individuals with serious health issues, and members of the U.S. 
armed forces.
158
    
 Someone like Juan with only one state misdemeanor marijuana conviction for less than 
twenty-five grams, no gang affiliation, and no immigration violations does not squarely fit within 
ICE’s stated “negative factors” that require “prompt particular care and consideration.” Juan 
actually falls under two of the positive factors, because he is a long-time LPR and has lived in 
the United States since childhood.
159
 Nonetheless, ICE still initiated deportation proceedings 
against him.
160
 It may be possible to categorize someone with that type of conviction as a 
“serious felon” or dangerous to “public health and safety.” However, that stance is difficult to 
argue in light of the federal government’s inconsistent position towards prosecuting marijuana 
dispensary owners in the 16 states that have legalized medical marijuana.   
B.  The Federal Government’s Lack of Action Towards Medical Marijuana Sellers 
Highlights Its Disparate, Harsh Treatment of Immigrants 
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 The legalization of medical marijuana poses a direct challenge to the federal 
government’s stance on marijuana and marijuana sales and reveals the disparate treatment of 
non-citizens versus that of marijuana dispensaries. Advocates of medical marijuana believe that 
selling marijuana to relieve pain and suffering is theoretically different than selling marijuana for 
recreational purposes.
161
 The California Medical Association even calls for full legalization of 
marijuana.
162
 However, under federal law there is no legal difference between selling marijuana 
for recreational use and selling marijuana to people who want to relieve their ailments. All 
marijuana sales for remuneration are felonies.
163
 Therefore, the fifteen states that have legalized 
medical marijuana in some form have acted completely in violation of federal law.
164
   
On closer inspection, the medical marijuana dispensaries in states such as California are 
basically marijuana stores. Californians with a doctor’s recommendation can possess as much 
marijuana as they need for their medical conditions.
165
 Doctors can recommend marijuana for 
ailments such as migraines, chronic pain, or any other illness that may cause “serious harm to the 
patient's safety or physical or mental health.”166 Patients can buy one-fourth or one-eighth of an 
ounce of marijuana from a marijuana dispensary or grower.
167
 While the dispensaries are 
theoretically supposed to be non-profit facilities, tax revenue from marijuana dispensaries in the 
city of Oakland, California alone totaled $1.5 billion in 2010.
168
 Americans for Safe Access, an 
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organization that supports medical marijuana legalization, reports that there are two hundred 
thousand sanctioned marijuana users in California about 2000 marijuana dispensaries.
169
 
During President Obama’s first year in office 2009, attorney General Eric Holder 
announced that the DEA would no longer raid or prosecute medical marijuana dispensaries.
170
 
For over two years the raids ceased and the dispensaries flourished while people like Juan were 
charged with aggravated felonies and deported for two gram marijuana sales. In October 2011, 
Eric Holder announced a change in policy and decided to begin raiding dispensaries and 
prosecuting their owners again, although as of this writing no raids or prosecutions have 
occurred.
171
  
Despite threats of federal enforcement, marijuana dealers appear to be undeterred.
172
 The 
federal government simply does not have the manpower to be able to enforce federal law without 
the help of state and local police forces.
173
 With the number of states that have legalized medical 
marijuana increasing ever year, it seems likely that subsequent presidential administrations will 
only have to deal with more violations and may need to reverse their enforcement policy again.  
Meanwhile, no matter how much states such as New York reduce the penalties for marijuana 
sales, unless the federal law changes, every state’s non-citizen residents may be permanently 
banished for these minor crimes.  
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While selling marijuana for remuneration remains a felony under federal law, it is patently 
unfair to permanently banish non-citizens from the United States for selling small amounts of 
marijuana while many marijuana dispensaries in California and other states continue to be able to 
sell marijuana for large profits. It is a non-citizen’s privilege to reside in the United States.  
However, it sends a confusing message to non-citizens and the world when the U.S. government 
decides to permanently deport a non-citizen for committing the same act that is occurring in 
many states under the premise of medical marijuana. Congress must have an open dialogue about 
medical marijuana and marijuana in general in an attempt to reconcile the state and federal laws.  
Until that takes reconciliation takes place, ICE should use its discretion to not begin deportation 
actions against those non-citizens who are only deportable by virtue of a single small marijuana 
sale.    
If ICE decided to actively use its prosecutorial discretion to not begin removal proceedings 
against non-citizens with small marijuana sale convictions, this does not mean that these non-
citizens would face zero penalties. Noncitizens who sell marijuana would still be subject to 
criminal sentences for their crimes at the state and federal levels. The only difference would be 
that at the end of their criminal sentences, these noncitizens would not face aggravated felony 
charges before an immigration judge.   
C. There is Currently No Other Viable Avenue for Relief for Non-Citizens with Small 
Marijuana Sale Convictions Except Prosecutorial Discretion  
 
  Some scholars who are dissatisfied with the current aggravated felony statutes propose 
that the aggravated felony statute should be completely changed to allow for more discretion for 
immigration judges.
174
 In order to specifically address the discrepancy between state and federal 
drug law, Congress could choose to reform the CSA. Critics of prosecutorial discretion believe 
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that it is not enough of a solution, because non-citizens who have committed crimes that may be 
aggravated felonies would continue to live in fear that someday ICE may decide to begin 
deportation proceedings against them.
175
 While these ideas and points are valid, they are not 
currently practical solutions for the estimated 3,572 non-citizens who are deported for marijuana 
sales each year.
176
 Congress last seriously addressed comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 
and was unable to pass the proposed legislation.
177
 That proposed legislation would actually have 
added more crimes to the already lengthy aggravated felony list.
178
 In light of Congress’s current 
gridlock and the upcoming presidential election, it seems unlikely that Congress will make any 
serious changes to the INA in the foreseeable future.
179
 Until then, prosecutorial discretion is the 
only possible solution.  
As far as federal drug law reform, there is currently a bill proposed by Representatives Ron 
Paul and Barney Frank which, if passed, would remove marijuana from the list of federal 
controlled substances so that states can decide how to regulate it.
180
  It is not expected to pass.
181
  
Instead of waiting, -potentially for decades, for any serious reform, it makes sense for the 
advocates of non-citizens with small marijuana convictions to support ICE’s use of prosecutorial 
discretion in their cases. Prosecutorial discretion is not a complete remedy to the situation, but it 
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would provide some relief for the non-citizens like Juan who have their lives invested in the 
United States, are otherwise law-abiding residents except for one conviction, and are earning an 
honest living in the Unites States to support their U.S. citizen relatives.   
VIII. Conclusion 
 Despite non-citizens’ advocates best efforts to the contrary, under the current scheme for 
analyzing immigrants’ drug convictions, courts must apply the modified categorical approach to       
§ NYPL 221.40 convictions. This approach means that many non-citizens with § NYPL 221.40 
will be ordered deported and removed from the United States and never allowed to return to the 
country. While some individuals might see these non-citizens’ deportations as an effective use of 
immigration law, it is hard to ignore the non-citizens like Juan who are productive LPRs of the 
United States and currently have no flexibility to argue that the positive factors in their lives 
outweigh one misdemeanor marijuana sale conviction. A complete overhaul of the INA might 
remedy those situations, but in the meantime, ICE should use its enforcement discretion to 
choose not to initiate deportation proceedings against immigrants convicted of statutes such as 
NYPL § 221.40. It is particularly appropriate for ICE to exercise its prosecutorial discretion in 
light of the blatant disregard for federal marijuana law by fifteen states and Washington, D.C. 
People like Juan should not be convicted of aggravated felonies for a marijuana sale of two 
grams while marijuana dispensaries in California make millions of dollars off of selling 
marijuana. Until the federal government and the states are able to reconcile their marijuana 
policies, ICE should use its prosecutorial discretion and decide not to begin deportation 
proceedings against non-citizens with small marijuana sale convictions.   
 
 
